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Abstract

Since its rise in the second half of the twentieth century,shadow banking has
grown to overtake commercial banking in the financial sector. The health of the
economy now relies heavily on the sustainability of shadow banks,as seen with the
financial crisis of 2008. This thesis will examine exactly how shadow banking
became such a vital component to the economy. It will look at the history of the
financial system that was conducive to the growth ofshadow banking, with an
emphasis on the Banking Act of 1933. Further,it will discuss key financial
instruments that are the backbone ofshadow banking operations,specifically those
that contributed to the banking panic of 2007. It will show that the banking panic of
2007 was the result of a series of runs on systemic financial institutions, which had
a similar effect as the bank runs of the Great Depression.
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I.

Introduction

In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. Wall Street came under heavy
scrutiny for its actions that nearly unraveled financial markets across the world.
Financial institutions have been bombarded with lawsuits alleging security fraud
and deception of both investors and the government Historically, the government
has kept the financial sector somewhat regulated to assure the public ofthe safety of
their assets. However,critics argue that this regulation can prevent financial
institutions from achieving their full potential of higher returns. To counteract
regulatory restraints, an evolution of financial intermediation took place — an
adaptation of the financial market that operated in the "shadows" of traditional
banking that included institutions such as entire investment banks, money market
funds, and credit hedge funds.
Economies function through borrowing and lending. Individuals borrow for
personal reasons such as car loans, mortgages,or student loans for college.
Companies might borrow to jumpstart their growth,fund everyday operations, or
purchase plant and equipment. In a direct lending market,these individuals and
companies must seek funding directly from savers, who in turn have the
responsibility of evaluating the risk and creditworthiness of the borrower.
However,a direct lending market is not ideal, since the costs and time invested is
enormously high (Noeth B., 2012). Traditional banking serves the purpose of
financial intermediation - a middleman that matches those who need credit with
those who are willing to lend their money.
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A capitalistic society is known for fierce competition. If one company is
successful with a certain product,a new company will enter the market with a
similar product, hoping to poach the already successful company's customers. The
banking world operates similarly, with the introduction ofshadow banking
analogous to that of a company entering the market to compete with the existing
firm. OfTering financial intermediation similar to that of traditional banks,shadow
banks are usually highly leveraged institutions that operate using instruments such
as asset backed mortgages(ABS),collateralized debt obligations(CDO),and
repurchase agreements(Repo)(Poszar, Adrian, Ashcroft,& Boesky, 2010).
The role of traditional or commercial banking as a foundation of the economy
is well documented and will continue to be as long as there is a need for capital by
those who do not have it. The advancement oftechnology and continuous attempts
to offer the best product have allowed the shadow banking sector to not only evolve
into a large, significant part of the economy but also one that holds that health of the
economy in the palm of it's hand.
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II. The Great Depression: The foundation ofshadow banking

The Roaring Twenties

In order to gain a clear understanding of the history ofthe shadow banking
system and its evolution in the United States, one must delve as far back as the Great
Depression to assess the financial system prior to the shadow banking evolution. If
there is a universal theme to the financial crisis of 2008,it is that history tends to
repeat itself, and there are in fact, many similarities between the Great Depression
and the "Great Recession.” There is a reason that financial crises transpire, and it is
not by accident or a random sequence of events. Similar to the period before the
recent crash in 2008,the period prior to the Great Depression was one in which the
financial sector saw little regulation during a time of extreme economic growth - a
period known as the Roaring Twenties.
The rapid growth in the 192O's was propelled by massive technological
advancement and increases in wealth,finance,and debt(Achaiya, Cooly,
Richardson,& Walter, 2011, p. 13). Government growth policies assisted the rapid
consumer spending on new technological goods such as the automobile. Millions of
people began pa5dng for these goods on installment pa5mients; it was a new "form”
of credit that made buying goods much easier. When credit was so readily available.
people began to, unsurprisingly,spend much more than their income levels allowed.
and had more obligations than they could handle. Households were struggling to
pay off debts and resorted to throwing money, much of which was borrowed,into
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the stock market to try and supplement their income. Due to overwhelming
speculation, the market continued to rise, and the prices ofstocks were driven to
record levels. Companies displa3dng their new technological advancements created
immense excitement for investors, who embraced the chance for risky high-)delding
returns(Neal & White, 2012). Unfortunately, most investors were not fully aware of
the risk being undertaken, until the crash in 1929, when billions of dollars of wealth
disappeared in a day. It is generally accepted that the stock market crash was not
explicitly responsible for the Great Depression but was instead more like the
ignition switch that started it. By the end of 1929,the Dow had recovered to within
a few percentage points of its record peak (Scardino, 1987). Perhaps an even
greater consequence of the stock market crash in 1929 than the decrease in wealth
was the fear it instilled in consumers towards the health of the economy.
Consumers and firms were forced to curb their spending, which crippled the
economy.
While the extent to which Black Tuesday facilitated the onset ofthe economic
depression is still argued,one contributing factor of the depression that is
universally agreed upon was the collapse of the U.S. banking system. In the 1930's,
there were a series of banking panics in which depositors withdrew their money.
fearing their banks would fail like the hundreds before them (Wheelock, n.d.). One of
the defining qualities of a bank is the capability of maturity transformation. That is.
in simple terms, borrowing short and lending long. One way banks borrow is with
customer's deposits, which are liquid,short-term debt securities that the customer
can withdraw at any moment based on his or her own needs. These deposits are
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tied up in illiquid, long-term loans that can not be recovered in the case of a mass
withdrawal request from customers. Of course,this form oftransformation is only
successful when depositors are willing to let their savings sit in the bank. When
depositors begin to question a bank's solvency, or when other banks start to fail, the
rational action is to withdraw deposits from the bank. Such was the case in the late
1920s and early 1930s,and the catalyst for one ofthe most important pieces of
banking legislation in history.

Banking Act of1933

After the stock market crash of 1929 that "triggered" the Great Depression,
the federal government conducted several investigations to expose the causes of the
crisis and its overwhelming systemic risk. It was concluded that a large determinant
of the crisis was commercial banks’ creation of an immense and indefensible credit
bubble due to careless and even fraudulent loans(Wheelock,n.d.). As previously
stated, once the stock market crashed,consumers were struggling to pay off their
debts,leading others to panic and immediately pull their money out of banks. In
this situation, the panic is the result of an incoming recession in which depositors
need their savings to spend in case of unemployment or wage cuts. Obviously,
individuals were fearful of their job securities and as a result, withdrew deposits
from their banks. The only people who precisely grasped the financial strength of
certain banks were those who worked inside them (Gorton G. B., 2010, p. 4). The
reaction sent the economy into a downward spiral due to the banks lacking the
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required reserve capital while simultaneously carrying high default rates on
speculative loans. More than 4,000 banks closed from 1929 to 1932,taking
depositors' money with them (Acharya, Cooly, Richardson,& Walter, 2011). As a
result, the government concluded that stringent regulation of commercial banking
was necessary. Several changes needed to be made,so the Banking Act of 1933 was
enacted to authorize these regulations and to keep the financial system stable.
This legislation, composed of several parts, aimed to steady the ship that had
been capsized. According to Achaiya, Cooly, and Richardson,the Banking Act of
1933 focused on three regulatoiy responses to market failure:
1. Identify the marketfailure - why the collective outcome of individual
economic agents and institutions does not lead to socially efficient
outcomes, which in this case reflected the financial fragility induced
by depositor runs
Z Address the marketfailure through government intervention - in this
case by insuring retail depositors against losses.
3. Recognize and contain the direct costs ofintervention, as well as the
indirect costs due to moral hazard arisingfrom intervention - by
charging insurance premiums for deposit insurance, restricting them
from riskier and more cyclical investment banking activities, and
orderly resolution at an early stage of distress.
(Acharya, Cooly, Richardson,& Walter, 2011, p. 2)
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For the purpose of this thesis, however,two key components of the Act are
discussed: deposit insurance and the restriction ofinvestment banking activities.
First, to keep bank reserves high and to allow for banks to confidently provide loans
to borrowers,a method of reassurance was needed in order for depositors to feel
secure about the safety of their money,even in the event of a banking panic. Banks
were susceptible to panics whether systemic risk was real or imagined. Depositors
have a natural inclination to believe that if a few banks begin to fail in the midst of a
looming recession,then other banks also will struggle. In response. Senator Henry
Steagall proposed the integration of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). Essentially, the government promised depositors that it would insure all of
their deposits up to a certain amount if the depositor's bank was an FDIC member.
However,there was still a potential problem that banks would make
speculative investments using FDIC deposits and take advantage ofthe safety net.
With the rapid growth of the economy experienced in the 1920's, banks and
consumer credit were forced to evolve in order to support the growth. Large banks.
such as National City Bank(now known as Citibank) and Chase Bank, were offering
the best of both worlds - services that dealt with security transactions while also
offering traditional products like deposits and loans (Rickards, 2012). Judge Louis
Brandeis warned in a collection of essays in 1914,titled Other People's Money and
How the Bankers Use It, that multifunctional banking would not be beneficial to
market competition due to conflicting interests. He argued that with a
multifunctional bank comes a large client base and that these clients would have
overlapping interests. He later gives an example,asking "can there be real
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bargaining where the same man is on both sides of the trade? The investment
banker,through his controlling influence on the Board of Directors, decides that the
corporation shall issue and sell securities, decides the price at which it shall sell
them,and decides that it shall sell the securities to himself." Brandeis was not
necessarily concerned with the "too big to fail" doctrine, but instead believed that
banks should have separate functions and broke down these functions into four
parts: commercial banking,trust and insurance,corporate underwriting,and
brokering (Kregel, 2010).
The second key point of the Glass-Steagall Act incorporated the separation of
commercial banks and investment banks. In 1922,sixty-two banks offered clients
securities services within the actual bank(Neal & White,2012). Even greater was
the number of banks with separate security affiliates, which rose from only 10 in
1922 to 114 in 1931. Bond originations from commercial banks rose by over
twenty percent in the same time period. Large corporations were accustomed to
dealing with investment banks and were not the source ofthe tremendous growth
in security transactions for commercial banks. Instead,this growth came from small
and middle-sized companies that were beginning to deal in the booming security
markets (Neal & White, 2012). Senator Carter Glass convinced other congressmen
that commercial banks would indeed have a conflict of interest if they were able to
both accept deposits and deal in securities transactions. Therefore,this separation
barrier restricted commercial banks from underwriting and selling securities while
simultaneously preventing investment banks from taking deposits. Commercial
banks (as long as a member of the Federal Reserve System)could no longer have
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securities affiliates. Essentially, it guaranteed that the safety of the FDIC would not
be compromised to fund the high risk, speculative investments that Wall Street
investment banks were accustomed to, nor would it have the ability to rescue them
if their investments turned south (Mitchell, 2010). Partly due to this barrier,the
country experienced vigorous growth backed by strong stability ofthe financial
market for the next fifty years. Commercial banking experienced stability from such
regulation and strong barriers to entiy,investment banks were lucrative in
government securities and international markets,and the stock markets steadily
gave investors dividends and capital gains under the newly created SEC's regulation
(Neal & White, 2012). All three branches of the financial system appeared to
intertwine to the benefit of the economy as a whole.
However,it must be noted that the Glass-Steagall Act was only partly
responsible for the years of economic growth following the Great Depression. For
example. World War II crippled every country in Europe, while it strengthened the
economy ofthe United States. Regardless ofthis fact, it is clear that the GlassSteagall Act played a part in banks' prolonged success.

A
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III. Emergence of Shadow Banking

Shiftfrom Commercial Banking

After decades of a healthy economy that saw very few large banks fail, a
change started to appear in the financial industry. The intended effect of the
Banking Act of 1933 and specifically the Glass-Steagall Act, was to ease public
concern over bank runs and solvency issues. In a general sense,the bill
accomplished its goal, but not without creating unintended consequences. The
commercial banking industry was slowly trying to shave back the shell cast over it
by the Glass-Steagall restrictions, but tried to do so in a way that kept the
governmental guarantees in place (Acharya, Cooly, Richardson,& Walter,2011, p.
2}. The reason behind commercial banks'constant plea for deregulation of GlassSteagall was that they were losing customers to competition due to innovation of
new financial products. However,the competition was not from other commercial
banks, but from a different sector of banking.
This other banking sector started emerging as a result oflight regulation in
the 1970s. Coined "shadow banking” in 2007 by former Pimco manager and
economist Paul McCulley,these financial intermediaries evolved as spin-offs that
operated in the "shadows" of commercial banks,or off the balance sheets of
regulated commercial banks(Noeth & Sengupta, 2011). There were several factors
that contributed to the financial innovation era, but,just as the market crash in 1929
might have kick started the Great Depression, if a breaking point had to be assigned
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as the trigger for this growth in financial innovation, one would look to the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system. In short, the Bretton Woods system sought to
maintain an international financial system with the allies of WWll,and its collapse
in 1973 exposed weakness in the US financial system. Financial innovations
developed at this time in response to the challenges and competition that followed
the liberation of international capital markets (Neal & White, 2012). It is important
to note that while the term "shadow banking” might sound prejudicial in its
description, it is in fact a crucial part of the financial system. Shadow banking grew
tremendously, evidenced from the fact that traditional banks’ share of U.S. financial
assets had declined by more than fifty percent(Date & Konczal). Figure 1 below
shows the growth of shadow bank liabilities compared to that of traditional bank
liabilities. As previously stated, the growth in shadow banking began in the mid1970s, but it didn't really take off until the late 1980’s as financial markets for
instruments such as derivatives expanded its customer base.
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Members of commercial banks believed tliat in order for commercial banking to
remain competitive in the market, it needed to free itself from the shackles of the
government regulation.
Commercial banks,funded by demand deposits, were starting to be replaced
by the capital market-funded shadow banks(Neal & White,2012). Why were
commercial banks losing customers to new shadow banks? What separates shadow
banking from traditional banking is the method in which the bank operates; shadow
banks look like a bank and operate similar to a bank, but are able to operate free
from regulation. In order to receive the freedom of light regulation,shadow banks
had to use other financial instruments for funding instead of deposits like those
used by commercial banks, meaning they were "without access to central bank
liquidity or public sector credit guarantees"(Noeth & Sengupta,2011). In fact,
former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker argued that with the help of recent
financial innovation,these shadow banks were created specifically to dodge
regulations that held back commercial banks(Acharya,Cooly, Richardson,& Walter,
2011, p. 3).
One of the several components of a shadow bank was the ability to provide
maturity transformation similar to commercial banking by collecting funding
through short-term deposit-like instruments such as money market funds,and using
them to provide long term credit to financial firms. Thus,shadow banks would then
be able to go through the process of offering direct loans. Figure 2 illustrates the
relationship between shadow banking and traditional banking.
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As Acharya, Cooly and Richardson (2011, p. 2] point out, there was extreme liquidity
for these illiquid loans by way of the derivatives and securitization markets, all
which operated relatively free of regulation.
Commercial banking was not as profitable after regulation due to the
increased cost of funding, as the banks had to pay insurance premiums among other
costs for receiving deposits. A shadow bank's funding, on the other hand, was not
insured and was initially viewed by the government to be less susceptible to
systemic risk. This gave shadow banks the advantage of securing funding at lower
costs (Date & Konczal). On top of this funding advantage, rating agencies, which
acted as a cheaper form of regulators, did not require as much capital support as
governmental bank regulators, giving shadow banks a leverage advantage. Because
of these advantages,shadow banks were able to attract clients to its lower-cost
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capital market. For example,corporate clients preferred short-term financing
through commercial paper markets, and the growing consumer credit card
businesses moved to specialty finance companies that were mostly funded by offbalance sheet securities. Many of the clients who remained with deposit-based
commercial banks were asset classes not well represented in capital markets. Small
to middle-market businesses with higher risk were unable to make the shift, which
was not necessarily beneficial to commercial banks. Essentially, banks were losing
profits and taking on more risk by losing their high-quality clients while keeping
many high-risk clients (Date & Konczal).
The Banking Act of 1933 started to become irrelevant as financing shifted
from commercial banks to non-bank institutions. Deposit insurance,a strict and
explicit method of risk control, was replaced with uninsured money market funds
that were perceived to be risk-free. In other words, most of the financing through
financial intermediaries effectively stayed the same while still circumventing tight
regulation. As seen in 2007-2008,these shadow banks would become susceptible to
bank runs similar to commercial banks prior to the Glass-Steagall Act.
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IV. How Shadow Banks Operate

The origin of the term "shadow banking" stems from two sources—it
reflects both the ambiguity surrounding the system and the fact that these non-bank
institutions operate in the "shadow" of heavy banking regulation. The Financial
Stability Board, an international committee designed to advance the nature of
financial regulation, claims that there is no specific definition of the shadow banking
system due to its constant fluidity and innovation, but broadly describes it as "credit
intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system"
(Financial Stability Board,2011). In order to grasp the banking panic of 2007-2008,
one must understand how shadow banks function. This section will explain in
further detail three crucial elements that most shadow banks rely on for operation,
namely money market mutual funds(MMMFs),securitization, and repurchase
agreements. Chapter 5 will clarify how these three financial instruments all
contributed to the system risk and illiquidity of many financial institutions in 2008.

Money Market Mutual Funds

The main distinction between non-bank intermediaries and commercial
bank intermediaries is the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet. The
shift in intermediation from commercial banking to other institutions is not a result
of the deposit system failing. For most investors, the deposit system is a safe system
for storing their savings. However,deposit insurance is not ideal for rich
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corporations, hedge funds, pension funds,and other institutions that need access to
safe, short-term investments with the ability to withdraw upon demand (Gorton &
Metrick, 2010). The FDIC insurance level of$250,000 clearly would not provide
much comfort for institutions depositing several millions of dollars.
One of the financial innovations in the 1970's that transformed the banking
system was the creation of one of the most popular forms of short-term
investments—money market mutual funds(MMMFs). The SEC provides a thorough
explanation of the defining characteristics of MMMFs:
Money market funds typically invest in government securities,
certificates of deposit, commercial paper of companies,or other highly
liquid and low-risk securities. These funds have relatively low risks
compared to other mutual funds and pay dividends that generally reflect
short-term interest rates. They attempt to keep their net asset value
(NAV)at a constant $1.00 per share - only the yield goes up and down.
But a money market's per share NAV may fall below $1.00 if the
investments perform poorly. While investor losses in money markets
have been rare,they are possible.(U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2013).
MMMFs are able to offer higher returns than their deposit-based counterparts for
two reasons. For one,the assets that MMMFs invest in have a potential for a higher
return. The other reason is that MMMFs are less regulated, while the Federal
Reserve's Regulation Q capped deposit interest rates. Gorton and Metrick believe
that MMMFs are one of the most significant innovations in the financial market over
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the past fifty years, evidenced by the rapid growth since inception. In 1980, MMMFs'
assets under management totaled roughly $76 billion. Twenty years later in 2000,
the assets under management totaled $1.8 trillion. At the height of the financial
crisis in 2008,assets under management for MMMFs totaled $3.8 trillion in the
United States alone (Gorton & Metrick,2010).
Money market mutual funds have been able to be successful due to the
belief that they are just as reliable as demand deposits at commercial banks, yet
offered a higher return. In the history of these funds, only two MMMFs have
"broken the buck," or dipped below the $1 per share net asset value(NAV). One
reason for this low failure rate of money market funds is due to fund sponsors
stepping in and contributing to the fund to maintain the NAV. The SEC reported in
December 2012 that almost 160 MMMFs have requested SEC approval to use cash
from a parent company to support the value of its fund. The SEC acknowledges that
the existence of these requests for permission does not necessarily mean that
support is needed. In some cases,funds may desire to purchase certain securities
that have increased risk to investors in order to maintain the fund's reputation
(ElBoghdady, 2012). Brady, Anadu and Cooper conducted a study on the frequency
and size of sponsor support on 341 MMMFs from 2007-2011. The data led to the
conclusion that at least seventy-eight of the funds were provided support totaling
$4.4 billion, with some funds receiving support more than once (Brady,Anadu,&
Cooper). In many of these funds,the support was not only just a means of
maintaining the credit rating or lowering risk exposure, but it was a true means of
resuscitation. Further, in 21 of the funds,support of over 0.5% of assets under
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management(AUM)was implemented,which could be a signal that the NAV ofthe
fund would have dipped below $1 per share had it not been for the support An
assumption could be made that several of the MMMFs in 2007-2008 would have
broken the buck had it not been for sponsor support
Another contributor to the low failure rate of MMMFs is regulation from the
government The Investment Company Act of 1940 places restrictions on which
securities MMMFs are permitted to invest in. For example,commercial paper is an
instrument that MMMFs invest heavily in, but they are allowed to invest only in
those with the highest or second-highest rating from two rating agencies. A fund
may not hold more than five percent of the fund's assets in securities with the
second-highest rating. Also,a fund may not hold more than one percent of any
individual issuer(Achaiya, Cooly, Richardson,& Walter,2011, p. 307).

Securitization

Arguably the most important innovation to the development of the shadow
banking system was the introduction of securitization. Joseph Shenker and Anthony
Colletta defines securitization as follows:
The sale of equity or debt instruments, representing ownership interests
in, or secured by,a segregated,income-producing asset or pool of assets.
in a transaction structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent
in owning or lending against underlying assets and to ensure that such
interests are more readily marketable and,thus, more liquid than
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ownership interests in and loans against the underlying assets.(Klee &
Butler, 2002]
It can more broadly be described as simply the pooling together of claims on
financial assets and packaging them into an instrument that can be sold in capital
markets. The first step in the securitization procedure requires isolating the
specified cash flow generating assets that will actually be involved in the security.
Typically, these include assets such as mortgages,commercial paper,credit card
receivables, auto loans, etc. The characteristic that is consistent with almost all
assets used in securitization is that of a predictable income in order to make the
principal and interest payments. These assets are then bundled into in a portfolio,
which is sold to a special purpose vehicle (SPV], which is a subsidiary of the
originating firm (sponsor) created solely for the purpose of servicing the security
payments,similar to the fiduciary responsibility of a trust. An SPV acts as a separate
institution in a legal sense, and it does not have employees or an office location. It is
merely a name with a set of rules that outline what is to be done with the asset
portfolio. The SPV finances the purchase of the portfolio by issuing debt instruments
to investors. Usually the portfolio is divided into seniority levels called tranches
that offer different interest rates for each tranche. The most senior level ofthe
security receives the lowest interest rate corresponding with the highest credit
rating. If the underlying assets default, or fail to produce the necessary cash flows,
then the junior tranches with the lowest credit ratings will suffer losses first. It is
also important to note that the cash flows generated from the collateral assets are
responsible for covering both the interest payments and the principal repayment of
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the bond. The capital raised from the securitization can then be utilized for other
investment opportunities (Dictionary of Economics). The popularity of
securitization stems from its effectiveness in transforming many illiquid assets with
long maturities that are unattractive to most investors into a debt instrument that
can be traded in highly liquid markets. Securitization enables small investors to
invest in a large asset pool. Figure 3 shows the cash flows moving between the
parties involved in the securitization process.
Securitization is one of the methods by which firms are able to finance
themselves "off of the balance sheet" by transferring assets to the SPV, meaning that
once the sale of assets to the SPV is completed,the assets and liabilities can be
removed from the originator's balance sheet This type of financing provides
several benefits for both creditors and the originator, most significantly that of a
bankruptcy cost benefit. SPVs are structured specifically to avoid bankruptcy.

Figure 3 - (Gorton & Metrick,2010)
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Without delving into the legal details of this structuring, should the portfolio of
assets fail to generate the cash flows needed,an early amortization process will
begin in which the principal is paid off instead of the coupon payments [Gorton &
Metrick, 2010], Securitization provides an allocation of risk that protects the
creditors of the SPV because they are able to remove themselves from the total
financial risk of the originating firm,even in the event of bankruptcy. Ultimately,
this allows the creditors to lend at an interest rate that reflects only the risk of the
SPV [Klee & Butler, 2002). In other words,the debt created from the securitization
would not include a bankruptcy premium, because there is essentially no risk of
default. There are also costs involved in securitization—for example,the costs of
setting up the SPV,losing the tax shield benefit of keeping debt on the balance sheet,
regulatory costs, and moral hazard—but for the purpose of this thesis will not be
discussed.
As stated earlier, there are several different asset classes that can be utilized
in securitization. One that dominates a large share of securitizations is that of assetbacked commercial paper [ABCP). An ABCP is a securitization program that creates
an SPV to issue commercial paper and then uses the loans to finance the purchase of
a portfolio of assets. The receivables from the asset portfolio are responsible for the
repayment of the commercial paper by the SPV. As securitization of assets became
more popular, it was easier for SPVs to secure their commercial paper issued to
investors. Adding to its practicality, firms prefer issuing ABCP because it is usually
not required to be registered due to its short-term maturity, which greatly lowers
the cost of issuing. Also, the SPVs of ABCP programs are able to purchase different
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asset types, allowing for a diversified portfolio. Due to its extremely short maturity.
liquid markets, and diversified portfolios of highly rated assets, ABCP was another
form of deposit like debt
Subprime mortgages, which allowed individuals with poor credit and low
income to mortgage finance their home, became infamous in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis. Securitization facilitated the growth in subprime mortgages by
supplying the demand for investing in this particular asset class. Subprime
mortgages grew to roughly $1.2 trillion in 2006,of which 80% was securitized
(Gorton G. B., p. 63). In the case ofsubprime mortgages, securitization created an
interlinking chain between financial institutions that resulted in a convolution of
information. The role of securitization ofsubprime mortgages in the 2008 crisis will
be expanded upon in the next chapter.

Repurchase Agreements

Another form of credit intermediation in the shadow banking system is the
market for repurchase agreements,or repos. According to (Brickler, Copeland,&
Martin, 2011),a repo transaction is a "financial transaction in which one party sells
an asset to another party with a promise to repurchase the asset at a pre-specified
later date". It is similar to a basic loan secured by collateral, except that in a repo
transaction, repo investors are able to sell the collateral in the event of bankruptcy.
In Slapped by the Invisible Hand, Gary Gorton explains that the repo market is
built around information-insensitive debt, which is debt that is "immune to adverse
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selection of privately informed traders"(p. 15). In other words,there is little risk of
being taken advantage of a debt instrument's value by someone more informed,as
opposed to equity, which is extremely sensitive to information. Demand deposits
were the original form of information-insensitive debt, but instruments such as
money market mutual funds and repo markets have stepped in as an alternative.
Repo is similar to deposits except that instead of individuals serving the role of the
lender, other firms and institutions (e.g., pensions funds and hedge funds) are
"depositing" their money short-term and receiving a bond as collateral. Gorton
explains that the collateral is supposed to be information-insensitive, making the
repo market a safe place to store cash. Similar to money market mutual funds, repo
markets replaced commercial bank deposits by insuring large amounts of cash with
collateral while also receiving a higher interest rate.
The following paragraphs provide an example of a repo transaction. A dealer
in need of financing "repos" an asset-backed security with a value of$100 to another
firm. The lending firm pays $100 for the ABS. At some point in the future,and in
most cases the next day,the dealer will buy the ABS back for a repurchase price that
is equal to the principal of$100 plus interest. The rate of return, called the repo
rate, a lender receives in a repo deal is equal to the repurchase price minus the
selling price, divided by the selling price. The repo rate is parallel to the interest
rate of demand deposits. If the dealer is unable to buy back the ABS,the lending
firm takes over property of the security.
The counterparty risk is on the loan is usually minimal because it is secured
and the interest is normally small. However,there is exposure to the risk of a
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deviation of the value of the collateral. Depending on the risk of the collateral,
lenders can require an overcollateralization, called a haircut. A 10% haircut would
reflect an ABS worth $100 that a lender will buy for $90. If the dealer fails to
repurchase the asset and the asset declines in value, the haircut offers protection for
when the lender must sell the ABS and recover the loss. The haircut can be also be
charged to the lender to protect against appreciation of the ABS in case the lender
does not sell the ABS back, but this is usually not the case (Acharya, Cooly,
Richardson,& Walter, 2011, p. 322). In terms of traditional deposit based banking, a
repo haircut is effectively the same as reserve requirements for traditional banks.
To increase bank solvency, a certain amount is required to keep in reserves for FDIC
member banks. A haircut works in the same manner by demanding that shadow
banks keep a certain amount of money in reserves for when borrowing in the repo
market. The haircut can also be viewed alternatively as the equity portion of the
loan. A 10% haircut would indicate a 90% loan to value ratio, requiring the bank to
find the 10% from elsewhere. As will be discussed later, by the crisis in 2008,
haircuts were as much as 45% of the repo asset value.
A valuable aspect of a repo transaction is rehypothecation, which allows the
lender receiving collateral in a repo deal to freely use the collateral in another
separate transaction. The collateral initially received can be used as collateral in
another transaction. Then that party can turn it over again to another party. The
idea of rehypothecation shows the extent of interlinking between banks and also for
the demand of collateral in daily operations. The repo market is built on the
collateralized loans, meaning that when a shortage of"information-insensitive'
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collateral occurs, it will create a strain on the entire repo market. As we will see,
rehypothecation can contribute to systemic risk by extending the already extensive
and complex link between financial firms.
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V. Banking Panic of 2008

There are many contributing factors to what happened to the global financial
system in 2008,though the most talked about factors are the deterioration of
housing prices, the subprime mortgage bubble,alleged predatory lending, etc. It is
similar to the credit fueled growth prior the Great Depression. As previously
explained, what ultimately sent the economy into a downward spiral during the
Great Depression were bank runs that deprived banks offunding to issue loans.
With a shortage of debt, consumers and corporations could not generate the funding
to buy personal items like a house and corporations were unable to invest in
equipment or materials. Due to the implementation of deposit insurance, bank runs
were thought to be a thing of the past. However,what occurred in 2007 and 2008
was also a bank run, only it was outside of the commercial banking deposit system.
There was a run on the shadow banking system comprised of repo markets, money
market mutual funds,asset-backed commercial paper,and other forms of short¬
term debt.
The common theme with the various discussions throughout this thesis is the
necessity of collateral to the shadow banking system. In Chapter III, it was
explained that shadow banks do not have central bank liquidity or guarantees on its
liabilities because it is financing off of the balance sheet. Therefore,in order to offer
a substitute to the demand deposit system,shadow banks must put up collateral to
insure default risk in a similar fashion to deposit insurance. The amount of
collateral required depends on a number of factors, but it must be noted that there
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is a relationship between collateral and credit rating; a downgrade in an
institution’s credit rating will likely trigger collateral posting and termination
payments in the same manner as an increase of the cost of debt for downgraded
corporate debt(Gorton G. B., 2010, p. 25]
A large portion of the asset classes used as collateral in the shadow banking
system are subprime mortgage backed securities. Most subprime mortgages have
adjustable rates, which were structured in a way that essentially required
refinancing and the appreciation of housing prices. The subprime mortgages could
be sold into a particular asset-backed security called a collateralized debt obligation,
which in turn were sold to structured investment vehicles,and so on,creating a long
chain interlinking financial institutions. There was a lack oftransparency with the
interlinking and the final resting points of the securities were not always known,if
at all.
Coupled with this lack of transparency,the introduction of the ABX(Asset
backed securities index] also should be credited to the banking run in 2007.
Created in January 2006,these indices are responsible for providing information on
the health of subprime mortgage values. The main point of the index is that it
allowed for the trading of subprime risk via credit derivatives. As(Gorton G. B.,
2010] describes it,"participants were finally able to express views about the value
of subprime bonds by buying or selling protection."
Even though it was virtually impossible to track the interlinking chain
involving subprime mortgage securities,the idea behind the subprime mortgage
securities is an attractive one,as long as housing prices continued to climb. From
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2000 to 2006, a period of rapid growth in subprime mortgages, housing prices
maintained a positive growth rate and refinancing was possible. Through the
process of securitization, originating banks participated in the "originate to
distribute" plan, a term describing the philosophy of creating as many mortgages as
one can, and then selling them off of the balance sheet. Many believe that this plan
led to an increase in predatory lending. For years it went unnoticed, however, and
beginning in 2006,short-term interest rates rose, economic growth slowed down.
and housing prices started to decline [Investment Company Institute, 2009). The
subprime borrowers were unable to refinance,and the interest rate spike from their
adjustable rate mortgages sent thousands of homes into foreclosure.

Run on Asset-Backed Commercial Paper

The idea of an interlinking between financial institutions tied together by
securities has been touched upon briefly. Unfortunately, not many knew the extent
of this chain until it was too late. Subprime mortgages became an increasing
component of asset-backed securities, and their problems began to infect the credit
markets. Asset-backed commercial paper had a dominant share of the credit
market, representing approximately $1.4 trillion in assets just before the crisis
[Carey, Correa,& Kotter, 2009). In the summer of 2007, credit rating agencies
started to realize the problem and reacted by downgrading securities that were
backed by subprime mortgages. Several financial institutions like hedge funds and
cash-like pools were unable to sell mortgage-related assets and suffered huge losses
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from subprime mortgage trades. ABCP was not as safe as investors originally
thought; it was not the alternative "information insensitive” deposit-like debt
instrument that it tried to mimic. In 2007, the ABX index plummeted,indicating a
drop in value of subprime mortgages. The result was a run on ABCP because
investors knew very little about the exact exposure levels to subprime mortgages. It
should be noted that the problem was not the size of the subprime mortgage market
in itself. The problem was that it leaked into all facets of the banking system.
Commercial banks and shadow banks, internationally or domestically, were
affected. No one knew which firms were exposed to risk and which firms were
protected. Subprime mortgages had been incorporated into securities, which in
turn were combined with other securities, which created a fear that all firms had the
possibility of exposure to subprime risk.
[Covitz, Liang,& Suarez, 2009) conducted an empirical study on the ABCP
run in 2007 and reached three conclusions. First, at the end of 2007, more than 120
ABCP programs, or roughly 40% of the entire ABCP market, were experiencing a run
that had a low probability of recovery. A program was considered to be in a run if
its outstanding paper was maturing but the program was unable to issue more. The
second conclusion reached was that the run did not occur within all programs, but
mostly weaker ones that had a lower credit rating. Finally, programs that were still
able to issue CP had explainable variations with their yield spreads and maturity
dates. Figure 4 on the following page shows the rise and fall of ABCP from 2002 to
2007. As seen in the figure, the massive run on ABCP decreased its total assets by
roughly 34%.
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Figure 4 - (^Gorton G. B., 2010)
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Run on Money Market Funds

Chapter 4 discussed the importance of money market mutual funds for
investors looking to store large amounts of cash for a short time period. MMMFs are
one of the largest suppliers of funding to the shadow banking system, and their
failure would have devastating consequences. The run on ABCP exhibited a "flight to
quality" in which investors substituted MMMFs for ABCPs. Indeed, one year from
the start of the run on ABCP saw money market funds grow by more than $800
billion, which is an increase of over 33%. Money market funds were safer due to a
number of factors: low leverage, liquidity, transparency, and MMMFs had been
divesting themselves of subprime mortgages (Investment Company Institute, 2009].
However, by September 2008, even MMMFs began experiencing stress. Only
one MMMF had broken the buck prior to late 2008, so investors were not
accustomed to potential losses in these funds. The stress was not a consequence of
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investing in ABCP, because most funds did not realize losses from ABCP. The trigger
that began the run on MMMFs started with the failure ofoneofthe largest funds
called The Reserve Primary Fund. Speculation grew in 2008 that the investment
bank Lehman Brothers was exposed to subprime mortgage risk. One of the largest
investors of Lehman Brothers commercial paper [not asset-backed) was The
Reserve Primary Fund, investing $785 million [Acharya, Cooly, Richardson,&
Walter, 2011, p. 309). This was especially risky for an MMMF,which supposedly
had the same risk level as demand deposits. In fact, the founder of the fund stated
that MMMFs should never invest in commercial paper because it was an asset that
carried too much risk. It appeared that the fund followed the founder's advice.
because the Primary Fund’s holdings report did not contain any commercial paper
until 2006. From 2006 until its ultimate failure, the fund began investing in large
amounts of commercial paper to try and increase its performance [Stecklow &
Gullapalli, 2008).
Once news broke of Reserve Fund's holdings of significant amounts of
Lehman debt, massive movement occurred to withdraw from not only the Reserve
Fund, but also other MMMFs that held commercial paper. Investors feared that
Lehman Brothers was not the only financial institution that had considerable
financial risk, and that fear translated into an aversion towards commercial paper.
The Reserve Fund ultimately broke the buck and folded, meaning investors were
unable to withdraw at the fixed price of $1 per share, while other MMMFs saw $172
billion withdrawn within the week. Commercial paper in MMMFs fell from 24% of
total assets to 17%, while government debt increased from 37% to 45%[Acharya,
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Cooly, Richardson, & Walter, 2011, p. 309). Not until the U.S. Treasury Department
guaranteed temporary insurance on MMMFs did the run stop.

Run on the Repo Market

Confidence is the most important aspect of the shadow banking system,and a
lack of confidence can lead to a panic such as the banking panic in 2008 that the
economy is still struggling to recover from. In the repo market,the confidence in
the value of collateral determines the ability for firms to receive funding through
repos. Obviously, lenders would not accept the risk of securing a loan by taking
subprime mortgage backed securities as collateral, especially once default rates
started to climb on these mortgages. There were plenty of other asset-backed
securities completely unrelated to subprime mortgages that could have been used
for collateral. So why was there a shortage of collateral that created a run on the
repo market? As (Gorton G. B., 2010, p. 134) explains, the problem was the financial
risk and exposure to subprime mortgage risk of banks that were posting the
collateral. If these banks began to fail, repo investors would be holding assets that
depreciated in value, not to mention the fact that the collateral might not be priced
right to begin with. As concern over counterparty solvency grew,apprehension also
began to grow over the liquidity of the collateral bonds. The influence of subprime
mortgages pulled down the value of other asset-backed securities because firms
wanted to hold more cash, causing the market for ABS to shrink, which forced a
decline in value of ABS.

L
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In order to compensate for the lack of confidence in collateral, lenders
increased system-wide haircuts on the repo agreements, which had a devastating
effect. As haircuts increased, firms that borrowed must find other ways to raise
money to achieve the 100% of the value needed. For instance,if a firm needs $100
and the haircut on a repo agreement is 20%,then the firm must find $20 from
another source. The other source had to come from the sale of assets, driving down
the price even further on ABS. As a result, they were less useful as collateral, which
in turn forced more sales (Gorton G. B., 2010). This circle of transactions was
unsustainable and ultimately led to insolvency in the banking system. Figure 5
displays the near vertical rise in the weighted average size of repo haircuts in 2007.
At the height of the crisis in September 2008,average repo haircuts went from 25%
to over 40% within one month.
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Figure 5 -[Gorton & Metrick, 2012]
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Comparison to the Great Depression

Just as the series of bank runs in 1933 led to systemic risk for banks,the runs
on various financial instruments in 2007 and 2008 led to global systemic risk. A
situation occurred in the shadow banking system in which there was a deep,
convoluted chain that tied Financial institutions together through securities and
other instruments. The difference between the Great Depression and the crisis in
2008 was that the runs were not carried out by individual investors from Main
Street. Instead, it was financial institutions like hedge funds, money market funds.
mutual funds, investment banks, and pensions funds that were racing to withdraw
funds from their short-term, deposit-like debt instruments.
Also, the stopping point of risk exposure was unknown to most of these
institutions due to the complexity of the transactions and the ability to keep a
transaction going. For example. Firm A suffers from solvency problems and the
possibility of bankruptcy is real. Hedge Fund B is overexposed with asset-backed
securities from Firm A as collateral in the repo market. Firm C holds the assetbacked collateral from Firm A because Hedge Fund B "rehypothecated" it. Money
Market Fund D is exposed to Firm C's risk because it holds a large amount of its
commercial paper and therefore reduces its overall holdings in commercial paper.
Firm D now is experiencing liquidity crisis because a significant amount of its
funding came from rolling over commercial paper with money market funds.
As the previous paragraph shows,the interlinking of financial institutions
created a major threat of systemic risk. It became an even larger problem in 2008
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because large complex fi nancial institutions (LCFls), often identified as "too big too
fail," were exposed to excessive amounts of this systemic risk.
Both the Great Depression and the financial crisis in 2008 required
government intervention to minimize the damage. Both instances resulted in
significant fi nancial legislation. In 1933, we saw the creation of the Banking Act of
1933 and Glass-Steagall Act, while in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act was enacted. The effectiveness of Dodd-Frank has yet to
be determined because the economy is still recovering from the current crisis. The
next chapter will discuss reforms in certain areas of the shadow banking system.

37
VI. Attempt to Reform

There have been calls to reform the shadow banking system prior to the
financial crisis in 2008, hut there has yet to be significant reform. The Dodd-Frank
Act passed in 2010 proposes regulation for traditional banking, however its impact
on the shadow banking system has yet to be determined. Dodd-Frank’s most
notable regulatory constraint for shadow banks is the recognition and regulation of
non-bank systematically important financial institutions (non-bankSIFIs). Under
Section 113 of the act, if the Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC)
concludes that the financial risk of a non-bank financial institution could threaten
the stability of the financial system, then the FSOC may subject that institution to
enhanced supervision and regulation from the Federal Reserve Bank (Greene &
Broomfield, 2013, p. 18). If designated a non-bank SIFI, that institution will undergo
regulatory restrictions comparable to other banks. Also, it is important to note that
the language of the Dodd-Frank Act relating to the process of designating and
regulating the non-bank SIFIs is quite broad, granting the FSOC discretion over the
final decision. The FSOC has not declared publicly any institutions as non-bank
SIFIs, but plans to do so at some point in 2013(Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2013).
Only time will show the effect of Section 113 on the shadow banking system.
Regulation for traditional banking continues to strengthen, and therefore so does
the growth of shadow banks as institutions seek to avoid regulation. New York
Times Dealbook stated that many small, start-up companies are turning to hedge
funds for financing after experiencing trouble receiving a commercial loan from
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traditional banks [Ciandel, 2011]. Shadow banking is essentially a system that has
the ability to provide funding for companies that otherwise cannot attain it If more
regulation was placed on shadow banks,some of these companies will have even
more trouble financing operations. The effect of shadow bank regulation on shadow
bank financing will be clear once the FSOC begins to designate the non-banks SlFls.
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VII. Conclusion

Although events such as the subprime mortgage crisis and the stock market
crash undoubtedly contributed to the financial crisis in 2008,the panic from
increased financial risk of the banking system was largely a result ofa series of runs
on funding markets such as asset-backed commercial paper, money market mutual
funds, and repurchase agreements. In the latter half of the twentieth century.
financial innovation and the desire to avoid more stringent banking regulation gave
rise to the shadow banking system, a credit intermediation system that provides an
alternate form of deposits and funding for investors and borrowers. Shadow banks
had several different methods of credit intermediation, such as issuing securitized
bonds or asset-backed commercial paper. Securitization fueled rapid growth in
certain asset classes, particularly in subprime mortgages, which enabled subprime
mortgages to infiltrate both traditional and shadow banking systems,creating
systemic vulnerability to subprime risk. Ultimately, this led to a decline in the value
of other assets used as collateral, leading investors to distance themselves from
firms backing loans with said collateral. Similar to the aftermath of the Great
Depression, these runs had a devastating effect on the current economy from which
it is still struggling to recover.
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